

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s

Reevaluating Eisenhower American Foreign Policy in the 1950s: A Fresh Perspective

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s invites us to look beyond the surface of one of the most complex and transformative decades in U.S. diplomatic history. The 1950s were a pivotal era marked by the Cold War's intensification, decolonization, and shifting global alliances. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration navigated these challenges with strategies that have since been debated by historians and political analysts alike. By revisiting Eisenhower's foreign policy decisions, we can gain a nuanced understanding of how America positioned itself on the world stage during this critical period.

The Context of Eisenhower's Foreign Policy

Before diving into the specifics, it's essential to set the stage for Eisenhower's approach to foreign affairs. Coming into office in 1953 after World War II and the Korean War's early years, Eisenhower inherited a world divided sharply between the capitalist West and the communist East. The Soviet Union, under Stalin and later Khrushchev, was aggressively expanding its influence. Meanwhile, newly independent nations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East were emerging as arenas for ideological competition.

Eisenhower's policies were shaped by a desire to contain communism without plunging the United States into another full-scale war. This balance between military strength and diplomatic engagement defined much of his administration's global strategy.

Key Components of Eisenhower's Foreign Policy

The New Look Strategy

One of the hallmark features of Eisenhower's foreign policy was the "New Look," a defense doctrine that emphasized nuclear deterrence over conventional military forces. The administration believed that maintaining a credible threat of nuclear retaliation would deter Soviet aggression more cost-effectively than large standing armies.

This approach had several implications:

- **Massive Retaliation:** The U.S. threatened to respond to any Soviet aggression with overwhelming nuclear force, which aimed to keep the Cold War cold.
- **Military Spending:** Eisenhower sought to reduce conventional military expenditures, reallocating resources to nuclear weapons development and

delivery systems.

- **Alliance Dependence:** The U.S. relied heavily on alliances like NATO to bolster collective security without direct military engagement everywhere.

While the New Look was praised for fiscal prudence and strategic clarity, it also faced criticism for potentially limiting America's flexibility in responding to smaller conflicts, a point that merits reevaluation.

Covert Operations and the CIA's Role

Another defining element was Eisenhower's increased reliance on covert actions, often conducted by the CIA, to influence foreign governments and counter communist expansion without open warfare. Notable examples include:

- **Iran, 1953:** The CIA orchestrated Operation Ajax to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, reinstating the Shah and securing Western oil interests.
- **Guatemala, 1954:** The agency supported a coup against President Jacobo Árbenz, fearing his progressive reforms leaned toward communism.

These interventions highlight a willingness to prioritize geopolitical interests, sometimes at the expense of democratic principles. Reevaluating Eisenhower's American foreign policy in the 1950s involves critically assessing the long-term consequences of such covert actions, including regional instability and anti-American sentiment.

Balancing Containment and Diplomacy

The Korean War Armistice

Although Eisenhower did not initiate the Korean War, his administration played a crucial role in ending active hostilities. Taking office amidst a stalemate, Eisenhower threatened to use nuclear weapons and increased military pressure, which helped bring about the 1953 armistice.

This move demonstrated Eisenhower's blend of brinkmanship and pragmatism — leveraging the threat of force while ultimately seeking a diplomatic resolution. It also set a precedent for how future conflicts might be managed, emphasizing limited war rather than total victory.

Engagement with the Soviet Union

Eisenhower's foreign policy was not purely confrontational. He made strategic

efforts to open dialogue with the Soviet Union, including:

- **The Geneva Summit (1955):** A meeting with Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin intended to ease Cold War tensions and discuss arms control.
- **The “Open Skies” Proposal:** Eisenhower suggested mutual aerial reconnaissance to build trust, though the Soviets rejected it.

These initiatives, while not always successful, reflected a willingness to explore peaceful coexistence, an aspect often overshadowed by the era’s aggressive rhetoric.

The Impact of Decolonization and Emerging Nations

The 1950s witnessed a wave of decolonization, reshaping global power dynamics. Eisenhower’s administration had to adapt to a world where former colonies were asserting independence and often caught between U.S. and Soviet influence.

Middle East Policy and the Suez Crisis

The Middle East was a critical region due to its oil resources and strategic location. Eisenhower initially supported nationalist movements to counter Soviet influence but faced challenges during the 1956 Suez Crisis when Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt after President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.

Eisenhower’s response was notable for:

- Pressuring allies to withdraw, emphasizing U.S. leadership and the importance of international law.
- Positioning America as a mediator and defender of stability without direct military involvement.

This episode revealed both the limits and strengths of Eisenhower’s foreign policy, balancing moral authority with strategic interests.

Asia and Southeast Asia Strategies

In Asia, Eisenhower’s policies aimed to contain communism without repeating the Korean War’s devastation. His administration supported regimes in South Korea and Taiwan, and backed the French in Indochina until their defeat in 1954.

Following the Geneva Accords, Eisenhower promoted the “Domino Theory” – the

idea that if one nation fell to communism, others would follow. This belief shaped early U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, laying groundwork for future conflicts.

Reevaluating Eisenhower's Legacy in Today's Context

Looking back, Eisenhower's foreign policy in the 1950s is often seen through contrasting lenses. On one hand, his cautious yet firm approach arguably prevented direct superpower conflict and maintained U.S. global leadership. On the other, some of his strategies – particularly reliance on nuclear deterrence and covert operations – introduced risks and moral dilemmas still debated today.

Lessons on Nuclear Deterrence

The New Look policy's emphasis on nuclear weapons reshaped international security doctrines. While it arguably kept the Cold War from escalating into full-scale war, it also sparked an arms race and raised the stakes of any confrontation. The challenge of balancing deterrence with diplomacy remains relevant in current global affairs.

The Ethics and Consequences of Covert Interventions

The covert actions undertaken during Eisenhower's tenure had profound effects on the countries involved. While achieving short-term geopolitical goals, they sometimes undermined long-term stability and fostered resentment toward the United States. This invites reflection on how foreign policy decisions impact local populations and global perceptions.

Diplomacy as a Tool for Peace

Despite the era's tensions, Eisenhower's efforts at summits and negotiations underscore the importance of dialogue even amid rivalry. His willingness to engage with adversaries offers a reminder that diplomacy can coexist with deterrence.

Reevaluating Eisenhower American foreign policy in the 1950s reveals a complex tapestry of strategic calculations, ideological battles, and emerging global realities. His administration's legacy is a blend of caution and boldness, success and controversy, which continues to inform how we understand Cold War history and the evolution of American diplomacy. Exploring these dynamics not only enriches our grasp of the past but also provides valuable insights for navigating today's international challenges.

Frequently Asked Questions

What was the main goal of Eisenhower's American foreign policy in the 1950s?

The main goal of Eisenhower's American foreign policy in the 1950s was to contain the spread of communism while avoiding direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union, primarily through strategies like deterrence, covert operations, and alliances.

How did Eisenhower's 'New Look' policy influence American foreign relations during the 1950s?

Eisenhower's 'New Look' policy emphasized nuclear deterrence and a reduction in conventional military forces to contain the Soviet threat cost-effectively, leading to increased reliance on nuclear weapons and intelligence operations to manage Cold War tensions.

In what ways did Eisenhower's foreign policy reflect a shift from previous administrations?

Eisenhower's foreign policy marked a shift by prioritizing nuclear deterrence over large conventional forces, emphasizing covert CIA operations, and focusing on alliances like NATO and SEATO, rather than direct military engagements seen in earlier administrations.

How did the Eisenhower Doctrine affect U.S. involvement in the Middle East?

The Eisenhower Doctrine committed the U.S. to defend Middle Eastern countries against communist aggression, leading to increased American political and military involvement in the region to counter Soviet influence, notably during crises like the Suez Canal conflict.

What role did covert operations play in Eisenhower's foreign policy strategy?

Covert operations, conducted mainly through the CIA, were a key tool in Eisenhower's foreign policy to undermine communist movements and governments without direct military intervention, exemplified by actions in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954).

How did Eisenhower's approach to the Korean War impact his foreign policy doctrine?

Eisenhower's promise to end the Korean War and subsequent armistice reinforced his focus on containment and deterrence, shaping a doctrine that sought to limit conflicts through strategic pressure and alliances rather than protracted ground wars.

What criticisms have historians raised about Eisenhower's foreign policy in the 1950s?

Historians have critiqued Eisenhower's reliance on nuclear deterrence and covert operations for escalating Cold War tensions, neglecting diplomatic engagement, and setting precedents for interventionist policies that sometimes destabilized regions.

How did Eisenhower's foreign policy contribute to the Cold War dynamics of the 1950s?

Eisenhower's foreign policy intensified Cold War dynamics by bolstering military alliances, expanding nuclear capabilities, and engaging in proxy conflicts and covert actions, which heightened rivalry and mistrust between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the 1950s.

Additional Resources

Reevaluating Eisenhower American Foreign Policy in the 1950s: A Strategic Retrospective

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s invites a complex examination of a transformative decade shaped by Cold War tensions, nuclear brinkmanship, and evolving global alliances. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration navigated a rapidly shifting international landscape, balancing military deterrence with diplomatic initiatives, while confronting emerging challenges in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This article delves into the nuances of Eisenhower's foreign policy, offering an investigative perspective that weighs its strategic successes and setbacks within the broader context of 1950s geopolitics.

Contextualizing Eisenhower's Foreign Policy Framework

Eisenhower's approach to American foreign policy was deeply informed by his military background and his commitment to containing the spread of communism without triggering full-scale war. The 1950s marked the height of the Cold War, with the United States and the Soviet Union locked in ideological and geopolitical rivalry. Eisenhower's doctrine represented a shift from the containment policies of the Truman era, emphasizing nuclear deterrence and covert operations as primary tools of influence.

His administration coined the term "New Look" policy, which prioritized strategic air power and the threat of massive retaliation to deter Soviet aggression. This strategy aimed to reduce conventional military expenditures while maintaining a credible nuclear arsenal. Reevaluating Eisenhower American foreign policy in the 1950s requires understanding this balance between military spending and diplomatic maneuvering.

Nuclear Deterrence and the “New Look” Strategy

One of the defining features of Eisenhower’s foreign policy was the reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent. The “New Look” strategy sought to leverage the United States’ atomic superiority to dissuade Soviet advances, reducing the need for large standing armies. This approach reflected Eisenhower’s concerns about the economic sustainability of military commitments and his desire to avoid another protracted conflict like the Korean War.

However, the policy also had significant risks. The emphasis on massive retaliation raised the stakes of any confrontation, potentially escalating even minor conflicts into nuclear war. The events of the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1958 Lebanon crisis exposed some limitations of this doctrine, where nuclear threats were less effective in resolving regional disputes involving less powerful actors.

Containment and Covert Operations

Beyond nuclear deterrence, Eisenhower’s administration expanded the use of covert operations to advance American interests without overt military engagement. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a pivotal role in orchestrating coups and supporting anti-communist forces worldwide, most notably in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954). These interventions aimed to prevent Soviet influence in strategically critical regions but often had long-term consequences for regional stability and U.S. reputation.

Reevaluating Eisenhower American foreign policy in the 1950s necessitates acknowledging the dual-edged nature of covert actions—while they achieved short-term objectives, they sometimes sowed distrust and backlash that complicated future diplomacy.

Key Regional Challenges and Responses

Eisenhower’s foreign policy faced distinct challenges across various theaters, each requiring tailored strategies that reflected the administration’s overarching goals.

Europe: NATO and the German Question

In Europe, Eisenhower reinforced the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. His administration supported West Germany’s integration into Western defense structures, culminating in the rearmament of Germany and its admission into NATO in 1955. This move was controversial but deemed necessary to strengthen Western Europe’s capacity to resist Soviet pressure.

However, tensions remained high, particularly over Berlin. The 1958 Berlin Crisis tested Eisenhower’s resolve and highlighted the limits of diplomatic brinkmanship. Although a direct confrontation was avoided, the crisis underscored the persistent volatility in U.S.-Soviet relations and the complexities of managing divided Germany.

Asia: Korea, Indochina, and the Domino Theory

The Korean War armistice in 1953 allowed Eisenhower to reduce American troop commitments on the peninsula, yet Asia remained a focal point amid fears of communist expansion. The administration intensified support for South Vietnam and other Southeast Asian nations, motivated by the “domino theory,” which argued that the fall of one country to communism would precipitate the collapse of its neighbors.

Eisenhower’s reluctance to commit ground troops in Vietnam contrasted with increased military and economic aid, setting the stage for deeper U.S. involvement in the following decades. Reevaluating Eisenhower American foreign policy in the 1950s highlights this cautious but consequential engagement in Asia, balancing containment with an aversion to large-scale military entanglements.

Middle East: Strategic Interests and Crisis Management

The Middle East emerged as a critical arena for Eisenhower’s foreign policy due to its oil reserves and strategic location. The 1956 Suez Crisis, triggered by Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, tested U.S. influence in the region. Eisenhower’s administration opposed the Anglo-French-Israeli military response, pressuring allies to withdraw and advocating for peaceful resolution through the United Nations.

This episode demonstrated a nuanced U.S. approach that prioritized regional stability and anti-colonial sentiment over traditional alliances. However, it also revealed limits in American leverage and foreshadowed future complexities in Middle Eastern diplomacy.

Reevaluating Eisenhower’s Legacy: Pros and Cons

From a contemporary vantage point, reevaluating Eisenhower American foreign policy in the 1950s involves weighing strategic foresight against missed opportunities and unintended consequences.

- **Pros:** Eisenhower’s emphasis on nuclear deterrence arguably prevented direct superpower conflict during a perilous era. His support for NATO strengthened Western alliances, and his diplomatic restraint in crises like Suez avoided broader wars.
- **Cons:** Reliance on covert operations sometimes undermined U.S. moral authority and destabilized regions. Limited engagement in early Vietnam arguably contributed to deeper conflicts later. The “massive retaliation” doctrine risked disproportionate responses to localized threats.

Furthermore, Eisenhower’s warnings about the “military-industrial complex” in his farewell address underscored his awareness of the growing entanglement between defense policy and economic interests—a tension that would influence

American foreign relations for decades.

Comparative Perspectives

When compared to his predecessor Harry Truman's policies, Eisenhower's approach was marked by greater emphasis on nuclear capabilities and cost containment. Yet, it retained the fundamental Cold War objective of containing communism. His administration's blend of overt diplomacy and covert action paved the way for subsequent presidents who grappled with balancing military force and political strategy.

Reevaluating Eisenhower American foreign policy in the 1950s also invites comparison with later Cold War policies, such as the flexible response doctrine of the Kennedy administration, which sought to address some of the limitations inherent in Eisenhower's strategies.

The 1950s foreign policy under Eisenhower laid foundational principles that shaped U.S. engagement during the height of the Cold War. Its legacy remains a subject of debate, reflecting the inherent complexities of navigating an era defined by ideological confrontation and nuclear stakes.

[Reevaluating Eisenhower American Foreign Policy In The 1950s](#)

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: *Reevaluating Eisenhower* David Allan Mayers, 1988-01-15 "These essays offer diverse opinions . . . and provocative insights. . . . They are a welcome reflection of current scholarly assessments of Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policies." -- Journal of American History "Probably the most balanced analysis of Eisenhower's handling of foreign and national security policy that has yet appeared, this book deserves to be widely read. Highly recommended." -- Choice

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: *Reevaluating Eisenhower* Richard A. Melanson, 1987

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: Dwight Eisenhower and American Foreign Policy during the 1960s Richard M. Filipink Jr., 2014-12-24 Dwight Eisenhower had a measurable impact on the foreign policy decisions of his Democratic successors during the 1960s due to his reputation as a military and foreign policy expert as well as his continued popularity when and after he left office. Eisenhower sought to influence his successors' policies for a number of reasons, including his underrated partisanship, his desire to protect the reputation of his administration, and his real concerns about the ability of his successors to successfully counter the communist challenge to American interests. Despite his steadily declining health, Eisenhower played both a public and behind-the-scenes role in shaping American foreign policy during the 1960s that had long-term consequences for the country. This book traces the interactions between Eisenhower and his two successors from the pre-inaugural meetings with John F. Kennedy, their direct contacts on Cuba, the use of intermediaries such as John McCone and General Andrew Goodpaster, and the constant contact initiated by Lyndon B. Johnson. Through these direct and indirect contacts, Eisenhower constrained the choices available to Kennedy and Johnson and shaped the politics and policies of the United States until the final months of his life.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: *The History of American Foreign Policy from 1895* Jerald A. Combs, 2015-02-12 This important text offers a clear, concise and

affordable narrative and analytical history of American foreign policy since the Spanish-American War. The book narrates events and policies but goes further to emphasize the international setting and constraints within which American policy-makers had to operate, the domestic pressures on those policy-makers, and the ideologies, preferences, and personal idiosyncrasies of the leaders themselves.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered* Gordon Martel, 2002-11-01 This major new textbook brings together twelve of the leading scholars of U.S. foreign relations. Each contributor provides a clear, concise summary of an important period or theme in US diplomatic and strategic affairs since the Spanish-American War. Michael Hunt and Joan Hoff provide an overview of the traditions behind US policy and a preview of things to come. Together, the contributors offer a succinct explanation of the controversies and questions that historians have grappled with throughout the twentieth century. Students will find these essays a reliable and useful guide to the various schools of thought which have emerged. Although each of the scholars is well known for their detailed and original work, these essays are new and have been specially commissioned for this book. The articles follow the chronological development of the emergence of the United States as a world power, but special themes such as the American policy process, economic interests, relations with the Third World, and the dynamics of the nuclear arms race have been singled out for separate treatment. *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993* represents essential reading for upper level undergraduates studying modern American history. The book has been designed and written exclusively to meet the needs of students, either as a major course text, or as a set of supplementary readings to support other texts.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: *Perceptions of China and White House Decision-Making, 1941-1963* Adam S.R. Bartley, 2019-11-26 This book assesses and evaluates the decision-making behavior of United States presidents and their chief advisers from Roosevelt to Kennedy pertaining to China. Seeking to dispel with the notion that each administration sought policy outcomes on the basis of a rational decision-making model, Bartley highlights the contradictions of adopted presidential decision-making processes and the nature of domestic politics as playing prejudicial and debilitating roles. The book demonstrates that elite decision-making processes interacted with assumptions made about Chinese behavior, interests, and attitudes only superficially and in some cases not at all. Misinformation and misperception were the natural outcomes. Reinforced by the politics of McCarthyism at home, intellectual debate on China policy was squashed, parochialism and nuance were shunned, and information was closed off. Ultimately, a divorce between the norm of behavior and the search for rational policy was registered in each administration. The net result was a lasting and destructive cognitive dissonance: to fit expectations of a China reality constructed, information was ignored, overlooked, and distorted. Offering new insights into the China policies of consecutive administrations from 1941 to 1963, this volume will be of great interest to scholars and students of American foreign policy, security studies, and international relations.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: *America in the World* Michael J. Hogan, 1995 A survey of the historical literature on intelligence and national security during the Cold War.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: *Dueling Visions* Ronald R. Krebs, 2001 The presidential election of 1952, unlike most others before and since, was dominated by foreign policy, from the bloody stalemate of Korea to the deepening menace of international communism. During the campaign, Dwight Eisenhower and his spokesmen fed the public's imagination with their promises to liberate the peoples of Eastern Europe and created the impression that in office they would undertake an aggressive program to roll back Soviet influence across the globe. But time and again during the 1950s, Eisenhower and his advisers found themselves powerless to shape the course of events in Eastern Europe: they mourned their impotence but did little. In *Dueling Visions*, Ronald R. Krebs argues that two different images of

Eastern Europe's ultimate status competed to guide American policy during this period: Finlandization and rollback. Rollback, championed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency, was synonymous with liberation as the public understood it--detaching Eastern Europe from all aspects of Soviet control. Surprisingly, the figure most often linked to liberation--Secretary of State John Foster Dulles--came to advocate a more subtle and measured policy that neither accepted the status quo nor pursued rollback. This American vision for the region held up the model of Finland, imagining a tier of states that would enjoy domestic autonomy and perhaps even democracy but whose foreign policy would toe the Soviet line. Krebs analyzes the conflicting logics and webs of assumptions underlying these dueling visions, and closely examines the struggles over these alternatives within the administration. Case studies of the American response to Stalin's death and to the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement reveal the eventual triumph of Finlandization both as vision and as policy. Finally, Krebs suggests the study's implications for international relations theory and contemporary foreign affairs.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars Mark Philip Bradley, Marilyn B. Young, 2008-04-30 Making sense of the wars for Vietnam has had a long history. The question why Vietnam? dominated American and Vietnamese political life for much of the length of the wars and has continued to be asked in the decades since they ended. This volume brings together the work of eleven scholars to examine the conceptual and methodological shifts that have marked the contested terrain of Vietnam War scholarship. Editors Marilyn Young and Mark Bradley's superb group of renowned contributors spans the generations--including those who were active during wartime, along with scholars conducting research in Vietnamese sources and uncovering new sources in the United States, former Soviet Union, China, and Eastern and Western Europe. Ranging in format from top-down reconsiderations of critical decision-making moments in Washington, Hanoi, and Saigon, to microhistories of the war that explore its meanings from the bottom up, these essays comprise the most up-to-date collection of scholarship on the controversial historiography of the Vietnam Wars.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: A Study of Crisis Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 2022-06-07 As the twentieth century draws to a close, it is time to look back on an epoch of widespread turmoil, including two world wars, the end of the colonial era in world history, and a large number of international crises and conflicts. This book is designed to shed light on the causes and consequences of military-security crises since the end of World War I, in every region, across diverse economic and political regimes, and cultures. The primary aim of this volume is to uncover patterns of crises, conflicts and wars and thereby to contribute to the advancement of international peace and world order. The culmination of more than twenty years of research by Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, the book analyzes crucial themes about crisis, conflict, and war and presents systematic knowledge about more than 400 crises, thirty-one protracted conflicts and almost 900 state participants. The authors explore many aspects of conflict, including the ethnic dimension, the effect of different kinds of political regimes--notably the question whether democracies are more peaceful than authoritarian regimes, and the role of violence in crisis management. They employ both case studies and aggregate data analysis in a Unified Model of Crisis to focus on two levels of analysis--hostile interactions among states, and the behavior of decision-makers who must cope with the challenge posed by a threat to values, time pressure, and the increased likelihood that military hostilities will engulf them. This book will appeal to scholars in history, political science, sociology, and economics as well as policy makers interested in the causes and effects of crises in international relations. The rich data sets will serve researchers for years to come as they probe additional aspects of crisis, conflict and war in international relations. Michael Brecher is R. B. Angus Professor of Political Science, McGill University. Jonathan Wilkenfeld is Professor and Chair of the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland. They are the coauthors of *Crisis in the Twentieth Century: A Handbook of International Crisis*, among other books and articles.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: Unfinished History Philip

L. Wickeri, 2016-09-30 This is the first collection of essays to discuss the impact of the Cold War (1945-1990) on Christianity in East Asia. In historical overviews, case studies and theological reflections, scholars from Asia, Europe and North America explore the variety of ways in which the Cold War has shaped the churches' involvement in society, politics and culture. The Cold War continues to have an impact the Korean peninsula, in Greater China and throughout the region. Churches are challenged to address the issues of the past that affect Christian life today. [Die in diesem Band gesammelten Aufsätze setzen sich erstmals aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven mit den Auswirkungen des Kalten Krieges (1945-1990) auf das Christentum in Ostasien auseinander. In geschichtlichen Übersichten, Fallbeispielen und theologischen Erörterungen erkunden Wissenschaftler aus Asien, Europa und Nordamerika die vielfältigen Wege in denen er das Engagement der Kirchen in Gesellschaft, Politik und Kultur beeinflusst hat. Der Kalte Krieg wirkt auf der Koreanischen Halbinsel, China und vielen anderen Ländern der Region noch stets nach. Die Kirchen sind herausgefordert, sich diesem geschichtlichen Erbe zu stellen, das Auswirkungen bis in das christliche Leben heute hat.]

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: Latin America's Democratic Crusade Allen Wells, 2023-09-26 By emphasizing Latin American reformers' decades-long struggle to defeat authoritarianism, this transnational history challenges the timeworn Cold War paradigm and recasts the region's political evolution. Scholars persist in framing the Cold War as a battle between left and right, one in which the Global South is cast as either witting or unwitting proxies of Washington and Moscow. What if the era is told from the perspective of the many who preferred reform to revolution? Scholars have routinely neglected, dismissed, or caricatured moderate politicians. In this book, Allen Wells argues that until the Cuban Revolution, the struggle was not between capitalism and communism—that was Washington's abiding preoccupation—but between democracy and dictatorship. Beginning in the 1920s, the fight against authoritarianism was contested on multiple fronts—political, ideological, and cultural—taking on the dimensions of a political crusade. Convinced that despots represented an existential threat, reformers declared that no civilian government was safe until the cancer of dictatorship was excised from the hemisphere. Dictators retaliated, often with deadly results, exporting strategies that had been honed at home to guarantee their political survival. Grafted onto this war without borders was a belated Cold War, with all its political convulsions, the aftershocks of which are still felt today.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: Notable U.S. Ambassadors Since 1775 Cathal J. Nolan, 1997-10-28 This book spans more than 200 years of U.S. diplomatic history. Its geographical scope widens along with the expanding interests of America itself, from initial exclusive concern with the empires of Europe, to the emerging nations of Latin America, to the commercial opportunities and geopolitical concerns of Asia and Africa. The ambassadors chosen for inclusion reflect these historical changes in American foreign relations. Organized alphabetically, the biographies present an implicit account of the evolution of the U.S. diplomatic service, from its founding and early principles through the 20th century evolution of its habits and culture.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: The Columbia Guide to the Cold War Michael Kort, 2001-03-08 The Cold War was the longest conflict in American history, and the defining event of the second half of the twentieth century. Since its recent and abrupt cessation, we have only begun to measure the effects of the Cold War on American, Soviet, post-Soviet, and international military strategy, economics, domestic policy, and popular culture. The Columbia Guide to the Cold War is the first in a series of guides to American history and culture that will offer a wealth of interpretive information in different formats to students, scholars, and general readers alike. This reference contains narrative essays on key events and issues, and also features an A-to-Z encyclopedia, a concise chronology, and an annotated resource section listing books, articles, films, novels, web sites, and CD-ROMs on Cold War themes.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: Perils of Dominance Gareth Porter, 2006-09-20 Gareth Porter presents a new interpretation of how and why the US went

to war in Vietnam. He provides a challenge to the prevailing explanation that US officials adhered blindly to a Cold War doctrine that loss of Vietnam would cause a 'domino effect' leading to communist dominance of the area.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: The Middle East and the United States David W. Lesch, 2018-09-03 This volume addresses the changes in the Middle East—and in the United States as well—that has significantly affected the US-Middle Eastern dynamic. It provides an objective, cross-cultural assessment of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: Groupthink or Deadlock Paul A. Kowert, 2012-02-01 The danger of groupthink is now standard fare in leadership training programs and a widely accepted explanation, among political scientists, for policy-making fiascoes. Efforts to avoid groupthink, however, can lead to an even more serious problem—deadlock. Groupthink or Deadlock explores these dual problems in the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations and demonstrates how both presidents were capable of learning and consequently changing their policies, sometimes dramatically, but at the same time doing so in characteristically different ways. Kowert points to the need for leaders to organize their staff in a way that fits their learning and leadership style and allows them to negotiate a path between groupthink and deadlock.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: Dawn Over Suez Steven Z. Freiburger, 2007-02-12 No event in post World War II diplomacy has been more written about than the Suez crisis of 1956-and for good reason: it signaled the fall of British power and influence in the Middle East. But most accounts, based on limited information, have focused on the invasion of Suez and the collusion between Britain, France, and Israel as the turning point in Washington's break with London and its assumption of power in the region. Now, using the most up-to-date U. S. sources and recently opened British records, Steven Freiburger has written the most definitive account to date of the Suez affair. His book is rich with fresh interpretations based on new evidence. Mr. Freiburger argues that the Suez crisis was only the culmination of years of American irritation with British imperialism in the Middle East; that the Eisenhower administration developed a coherent anti-colonial plan; that Washington used the Suez crunch to pressure Anthony Eden's removal as prime minister; and that in the end American strategy was a failure-it alienated the Arabs and permitted Soviet expansion in the region. Dawn Over Suez is an important reappraisal of a critical period in American diplomacy and offers keys to understanding our present-day problems in the Middle East.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974 Evelyn Goh, 2004-11-22 With Nixon's historic reconciliation with China in 1972, Sino-American relations were restored, and China moved from being regarded as America's most implacable enemy to a friend and tacit ally. Existing accounts of the rapprochement focus on the shifting balance of power between the USA, China and the Soviet Union, but in this book Goh argues that they cannot adequately explain the timing and policy choices related to Washington's decisions for reconciliation with Beijing. Instead, she applies a more historically sensitive approach that privileges contending official American constructions of China's identity and character. This book demonstrates that ideas of reconciliation with China were already being propagated and debated within official circles in the USA during the 1960s. It traces the related policy discourse and imagery, and examines their continuities and evolution into the early 1970s that facilitated Nixon's new policy.

reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s: The Wilsonian Impulse Mary N. Hampton, 1996-07-11 Mary Hampton argues that a set of ideas that influenced American policymakers in the postwar era help explain the unique evolution of the Western Alliance and Germany's rapid unification in 1990. These ideas, called the Wilsonian impulse, derived from the historical lessons concerning World War I and the interwar years learned by prominent American policymakers. The most important lesson was that a trans-Atlantic community of nations must be built that included a democratic and equal Germany. West German leaders were persistent in

appealing to the Wilsonian impulse to promote their national interests. In particular, Bonn was able to ensure over time Washington's pledge to aid in the peaceful unification of Germany. The success of that policy became evident in 1990. Recent works in international relations theory have explored the impact of ideas on international institutions and on the foreign policymaking process. This study contributes to that literature by examining the role ideas have had on the evolution of Western relations in the postwar era. Hampton focuses on the cluster of ideas she calls the Wilsonian impulse. Derived from the historical lessons drawn from World War I and the interwar years, these distinctly Wilsonian ideas largely constructed the beliefs that American foreign policymakers held about trans-Atlantic relations in the immediate postwar period. Central was the belief that the European balance of power system must be superseded by a Western community of nations wherein a democratic Germany would be included on an equal basis. Hampton examines how the influence of the Wilsonian impulse permitted West German leaders to gain rapid entrance into the Western Alliance on favorable terms. More importantly, the U.S. led the West in sharing responsibility for the eventual unification of Germany as part of the Allied pledge of support for Bonn. The peaceful unification of Germany in 1990 brought to fruition the future envisioned by the Wilsonian impulse. This book will be of interest to scholars and researchers of 20th century American foreign policy and modern German history.

Related to reevaluating eisenhower american foreign policy in the 1950s

Is re-evaluate or reevaluate the correct spelling? - Answers Re-evaluation = evaluate it again. (I think you ignored some facts in your evaluation. Do it again.) Revaluation = value it again, e.g., I think you're under-pricing that car.

How did Albert Einstein did not know how to open a door? He was not afraid to challenge existing beliefs and theories if the evidence warranted it, and he was always open to reevaluating his own ideas in light of new information

Is re-evaluate or reevaluate the correct spelling? - Answers Re-evaluation = evaluate it again. (I think you ignored some facts in your evaluation. Do it again.) Revaluation = value it again, e.g., I think you're under-pricing that car.

How did Albert Einstein did not know how to open a door? He was not afraid to challenge existing beliefs and theories if the evidence warranted it, and he was always open to reevaluating his own ideas in light of new information

Is re-evaluate or reevaluate the correct spelling? - Answers Re-evaluation = evaluate it again. (I think you ignored some facts in your evaluation. Do it again.) Revaluation = value it again, e.g., I think you're under-pricing that car.

How did Albert Einstein did not know how to open a door? He was not afraid to challenge existing beliefs and theories if the evidence warranted it, and he was always open to reevaluating his own ideas in light of new information

Related Articles

- [short form financial affidavit florida](#)
- [the art of being normal lisa williamson](#)
- [dlab study guide](#)

[Back to Home](#)